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Abstract
We apply a generalized quantum game formalism to the phenom-
ena of quantum cloning and quantum state estimation. We nd that
both phenomena can be usefully viewed as quantum games. We com-
pute the corresponding Nash equilibria and payos for both phenom-





The topic of quantum games is a new area of study within quan-
tum information, and its potential usefulness and consequences are
still being explored and understood [1, 2, 3]. This paper argues that,
in addition to the eciency benets of playing games quantum me-
chanically [4], game-theoretic language and techniques are well-suited
to deal with situations of conflict where one player’s loss means an-
other player’s gain. This scenario is particularly important in cryptog-
raphy, since one can always imagine that the cryptographer and the
adversary (i.e. enemy) are playing a two-player zero-sum game. The
impossibility of achieving perfect quantum cloning and the impossi-
bility of distinguishing arbitrary states, are the two pillars that render
quantum cryptography possible. It would therefore be interesting to
cast these concepts in a game-theoretic framework, and determine the
corresponding equilibrium points and payos. This is the goal of the
present paper.
We start by dening the rules of the game of quantum state esti-
mation. Player II chooses an arbitrary pure state jψi 2 C2. He then
sends jψi⊗N to player I and jψi to the referee. Player I’s task after
receiving the N qubits from player II, is to perform a measurement on
them. Based on the outcome, player I sends a pure state jφi 2 C2 to
the referee. For example, if player I decides to use the set of POVM
operators fMmg to do the measurement, and if he associates state
jφmi to measurement outcome m, the nal state that he sends back




m]jφmihφmj where ρ = (jψihψj)⊗N .
After receiving the two qubits from player I and player II, we imagine
that the referee uses the SWAP-test [5] on them: if the test says that
the two states are equal, he awards a payo of 1 to player I and −1
to player II. Otherwise, player I gets a payo of −1 and player II a
payo of 1. In terms of expected payo, this game is equivalent to the
game discussed in Ref. [6].
The above game is a generalization of games considered in Ref. [4].
One particular dierence is that the referee no longer issues, and re-
ceives at the end, all the qubits employed in the game. More funda-
mentally, however, this game of state estimation involves communica-
tion via qubits. Comparing to the strategy sets discussed in Ref. [4],
we place a severe restriction on players’ strategy sets. This is justi-
able because only a particular quantum operation is of interest - these
restrictions then render the calculation possible. The so-called Min-
max theorem is well-known in classical game theory: we now show
that a generalized form of Minmax theorem holds for the quantum
game.
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where ΩI and ΩII are the strategic sets for player I and player II re-
spectively and P (χ, ξ) is the payo for player I.
Proof: We treat the case for N = 1. Cases for arbitrary N can
be treated similarly. We note that the proof is similar to that of
theorem 2 in Ref. [4]. For N = 1, we use 3 qubits to play this game.
We assume that the referee generates the state ρ = j000ih000j and
sends the rst two qubits to player II and the last qubit to player I.
Player II now has the freedom to operate on them by transforming
the state to W ⊗WρW y ⊗W y where W is an arbitrary unitary map
chosen by him. Player II then sends the rst qubit to the referee and
and the second qubit to player I. Player I measures the qubit sent from
player II (the second qubit) with respect to a set of POVM operators
fMmg and then applies the unitary map Um on the qubit he received
from the referee (the third qubit) if the measurement outcome is m.
He then submits the qubits to the referee. After receiving all three
qubits, the referee does a SWAP-test on the rst and the third qubits.
We let fSkg, k 2 f0, 1g be the set of POVM operators corresponding
to the SWAP-test, with outcome 0 being the answer YES and outcome
1 being the answer NO. Denoting Sy0S0−Sy1S1 by R, the payo is then∑
m
tr[R(I ⊗Mm ⊗Um)(W ⊗W ⊗ I)ρ(W y ⊗W y ⊗ I)(I ⊗M ym ⊗U ym)].
We now use a xed set of operators fEg, E 2 R16 which form a
basis for the set of operators on the state space. The payo can then
be written as ∑
;;γ;
χξγAγ
where Aγ := tr[R(I ⊗ E)(Eγ ⊗ I)ρ(Ey ⊗ I)(I ⊗ Ey)]. We denote
the set of allowable χ by Ω0I and the set of allowable ξ by Ω
0
II. We
further denote the convex closure of Ω0I by ΩI and that of Ω
0
II by ΩII.
We note that Ω0I = ΩI and ΩII corresponds to allowing player II to
submit probabilistic ensembles of pure states. These are referred to as
mixed strategies in classical game theory. The theorem now follows by
invoking the (classical) Minimax theorem in Ref. [7] because Ωks are
compact and convex, and P (χ, ξ) is linear and continuous in χ and ξ.
Q.E.D.
With the above theorem in mind, we are now ready to compute
the Nash equilibria for this quantum state estimation game. First we
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denote the value of the game, i.e., max2ΩI min2ΩII P (χ, ξ), by ν. As
shown in Ref. [6], where ξ is the strategy of generating the pure state
with uniform probability with respect to the polarization direction,
max2ΩI P (χ, ξ
) = (N + 1)/(N + 2). Hence, ν  (N + 1)/(N + 2).
We now show that ν is actually equal to (N + 1)/(N + 2). From
Theorem 1, we learn that for any χ 2 ΩI, there exists a λ such that
P (χ, ξ)  λ for all ξ 2 ΩII. Therefore, the problem of obtaining an
optimal strategy for player I reduces to the problem of maximizing λ
for all ξ 2 ΩII. Since we have restricted player II’s set of strategies to
be the set of any probabilistic ensemble of pure states, the problem can
once again be reduced to maximizing λ, given that player II can only
choose one particular pure state instead of a probabilistic ensemble of
them.
We will now solve this problem of obtaining an optimal strategy
for player I, or equivalently maximizing λ, by generalizing the method
presented in Ref. [8]. For an arbitrary state jψi, the expected payo
for player I is ∑
m
tr[MmρM ym]tr[jφmihφmjjψihψj].
Without loss of generality, we may rewrite the above as∑
m
tr[M ymMm(UσU
y)⊗N ]tr[UσU yUmσU ym]
for some σ known to player I, such that UmσU ym = jφmihφmj and
(UσU y)⊗N = ρ for some U which is unknown to him. We now imagine
that player I selects at random a unitary operatorW . He appliesW⊗N
to the qubits player II sent him, measures them with respect to the
POVM fMmg, and nally applies W y to the pure state he generates,
before sending it to the referee. We note that if the original strategy
is optimizing, this modied version of it still is. The expected payo





yW y)⊗N ]tr[UσU yW yUmσU ymW ]
where dW denotes the integration with respect to the normalized Haar
measure of the unitary group of C2. Upon substituting WU ! W ,





y)⊗N ]tr[WσW yUmσU ym].
This is Equation (1) in Ref. [8]. Therefore, the rest of these authors’
analysis follows and hence ν = (N+1)/(N +2). The optimal strategy
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found in Example A of Ref. [8], also gives us a strategy at the Nash
equilibrium after some modication. Explicitly, denoting the POVM
measurement found there by fMmg and letting jφmi be the state to
be submitted if the measurement outcome is m, the Nash equilibrium
corresponds to picking at random a unitary map W , applying W⊗N
to the state to be measured, then submitting W yjφmi if the outcome
is m. For player II, since max2ΩI P (χ, ξ
) = (N + 1)/(N + 2) = ν
where ξ is the strategy of generating the pure state with uniform
probability with respect to the polarization direction, ξ is a strategy
at Nash equilibrium for him.
To summarize, we have succeeded in nding one particular strategy
prole at Nash equilibrium. However, do we need to worry about other
strategy proles also at Nash equilibrium? The answer is No because
of the following theorem:
Theorem 2 In a two-player zero-sum game, let (χ1, ξ1) and (χ2, ξ2)
be two equilibrium pairs. Then
1. (χ1, ξ2) and (χ2, ξ1) are also equilibrium pairs, and
2. P (χ1, ξ1) = P (χ2, ξ2) = P (χ1, ξ2) = P (χ2, ξ1).
Proof: The proof can be found in Ref. [9]. Q.E.D.
Unlike in general games where one should worry about multiple Nash
equilibria, a strategy at equilibrium is as good as any others in a
two-player zero-sum game. Therefore, nding one is enough as far as
playing the game is concerned.
We now consider the case N = 1 as an example. In Ref. [6], with
the assumption that player II adopts the strategy of choosing the
pure state with uniform probability with respect to the polarization
direction, Massar and Popescu found that the optimal strategy for
player I is to always measure the qubit along the z-axis and to submit
to the referee a qubit polarized along the +z or −z direction according
to the outcome of the measurement. However this is not a strategy
at equilibrium: if player II only chooses qubits polarized along the
x-axis, the expected payo for player I will only be 1/2 instead of
2/3, which is the value of the game. Player I should instead start by
picking at random a unitary map W , and apply it to the state before
measuring it along the z-axis - he should then submit W yj + zi or
W yj − zi according to the measurement outcome.
We now turn to a game-theoretic discussion of quantum cloning. In
Ref. [10], Werner introduces the quantum cloning game, and optimizes
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the cloning map with respect to a specc measure of success. He also
states that it would be interesting to search for the equilibrium points
of this game. We will now show that Werner’s cloning map is in fact
a strategy at Nash equilibrium. The proof proceeds as follows. We
imagine a game where player II chooses a pure state jψi 2 H where
H = Cd, and he sends the state (jψihψj)⊗N to player I and the state
(jψihψj)⊗M to the referee. After receiving the state from player II,
player I designs a device that takes as input (jψihψj)⊗N and outputs
a state σ such that σ is a density operator in H⊗M . He then sends σ
to the referee. Finally, the referee uses the SWAP-test on (jψihψj)⊗M
and σ. If they pass the test, he awards a payo of 1 to player I and −1
to player II, and he awards −1 to player I and 1 to player II otherwise.
A slight variation of Theorem 1 tells us the following equality which










Since the strategic sets are compact and P (, ) continuous, the value
can be written as sup2ΩI inf2ΩII P (χ, ξ). Furthermore, since ΩII de-
notes the set of probabilistic ensembles of pure states, the inmum






P (χ, ξ) (1)
where  is the set of strategies whereby player II can only choose one
particular pure state, rather than a probabilistic mixture of many.
The proof is now complete since the quantity in Eq. (1) is the measure
Werner identied for optimization (see Eq. (10) in Ref. [10]). There-
fore, following the analysis of Werner [10], the value of this game is





and the unique strategy at
equilibrium for player I is the following operation:
ρ 7! d[N ]
d[M ]
sM (ρ⊗ 1⊗(M−N))sM
where sM is the orthogonal projection of HM onto its Bose space.
We claim that a strategy at equilibrium for player II in the quan-
tum cloning game corresponds to generating a pure state with uni-
form probability with respect to the unitary group of H. To show
this, we rst of all denote this strategy by ξ and let λ := P (χ, ξ) =
sup2ΩI P (χ, ξ
). We also denote the map corresponding to χ as T .
In other words, λ =
∫
dUtr[ρ⊗MU T
(ρ⊗NU )] where ρ is some arbitrary
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pure state and ρU = UρU y. Our aim is to show that λ  d[N ]/d[M ].
We let T be the average of T  with respect to sitewise rotations, i.e.
T (ρ) =
∫
dUU y⊗MT (U⊗NρU y⊗N )U⊗M .
T is again optimizing with respect to the strategy ξ as well as being
covariant and hence is a universal cloner. Therefore, λ = tr[ρ⊗MT (ρ⊗N )]
for some pure state ρ, which, as shown previously, must be less than
d[N ]/d[M ]. Therefore, the proof of the claim follows.
In summary we have discussed the games of quantum state esti-
mation and quantum cloning, and have found the corresponding Nash
equilibria in them. In particular, to protect against the attacks of
cloning and state estimation in a cryptographic setting, the best strat-
egy for a two-level system is to issue a state with uniform probability
with respect to the unitary group of C2, in accordance with our intu-
ition. The concepts and techniques developed here should be useful in
other such adversarial scenarios. We also note that although we have
restricted the referee’s action to be physical, hence rendering some sit-
uations impossible [11], this need not be the case. In fact, the Minmax
theorem holds as long as the payo function is rendered linear with re-
spect to χ and ξ. We conclude by noting that it is well-known among
computer scientists that bounds on classical computing can be proved
by classical game-theoretic techniques [12]. So could quantum games
pay back this debt by passing similar benets back over to quantum
computation? The answer awaits further investigation.
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